military science

For all that has been written about the American reaction to September 11, who could have thought that a mere 128 pages could offer a sweeping and refreshing look into America's historic quest for security-and to do so while demonstrating the relevance of that historical exercise for the present.

John Lewis Gaddis, a historian at Yale University, aims at "an admittedly premature effort to treat, as history, an event that remains inescapably part of our present": the September 11 attacks on America and the Bush Administration's response to them. The product is an intellectual and historical tour de force, which dissects the American desire for security by looking at what its government did the last two times it was faced with a similar predicament: after the British burned the White House and Capitol Hill in 1814, and after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941.

The three dominant themes employed (or conceived) by John Quincy Adams were unilateralism, preemption, and hegemony. Roosevelt's reaction to Pearl Harbor, on the other hand, rested on multilateralism and a rejection of preemption; ironically, he still achieved the third: hegemony. The book then proceeds to carefully craft an analysis (and critique) between those two historical precedents and President Bush's reaction after September 11.

It is hard to imagine another book that can look so clearly and refreshingly at the major security issues confronting American foreign policy at the time; and to do so in so few pages. Nor is it imaginable that anyone could have summarized in a single paragraph his or her suggestion about what America foreign policy should be aimed at (no spoilers here: read the book). Yet, this is precisely what one will encounter reading "Surprise, Security, and the American Experience."

American foreign policy and international relations are made up of wars, treaties, doctrines, and so forth. A lot of details and sometimes a unifying perspective (e.g., Cold War and containment of USSR/Communism) gives us the sweep of history and content for many other books.

This little book offers something a little different: the meta-policy of America. The even larger scale of American foreign policy. On this scale the grounding in the country's principles together with the continuity of concerns and decisions becomes clear and understandable.

Three attacks surprised Americans - the burning of the capital in 1814, the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941, and 9/11/2001. Based on concern for security and national principles the foreign policy (on this scale) was set, driven by three leaders.

The first leader was John Quincy Adams. The meta-policy combined notions of preemptive action, unilateral authority, and hegemonic power. The scope for these was this hemisphere. The meta-policy lasted pretty well until Pearl Harbor, though in practice it was not regi;ar;y (or even at all?) applied after World War I.

Second was Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the policy altered the notions somewhat. For WW II and the Cold War era. The scope was world wide and the actors were nation states and alliances of nations.

Third is George Walker Bush. In this era America has reverted somewhat to the Adams era approach. The scope is still world wide however the actors include transnational entities (such as al Queda).

I will leave the review there. The author marshalls events, documents, and the usual historical elements to support this continuity of American meta-policy. While President Bush's doctrine of preemption has far more historical context and perspective than many give him credit for (the neocons hardly invented this), there are also deviations and expansions that the author calls into question.

This book is neither a critique of Bush, nor a full fledged critique of these policies. The author does not attempt to compare President Bush to President Roosevelt for greatness.

The book left me considering a much larger historical perspective for American actions, and a greater sense of continuity and even consistency than the chattering press credits. It might also be good for a few foreign correspondents to read since it seems many outside American are unaware of American foreign policy (there is none, or it is shoot-from-the-hip Cowboyism) and American perspective on security. For all who read this book tomorrow's newspaper articles on the war, Iraq, terrorism, etc. will read just a little bit different.

How does USA react when it is attacked on its own soil?. How does it deal with the knowledge that it is vulnerable, and that others can shatter its security?. Yale's professor John Lewis Gaddis tries to answer these questions and a few more in this small but interesting essay...

The author studies the different ways in which USA has reacted throughout history, when its security has been breached. For example, he mentions the burning of Washington of 1814, and the Pearl Harbour attack of 1941. He points out that different strategies were conceived in those occasions in order to deal with the unexpected. On the one hand, the 1814 attack led to a strategy based on preemption, unilateralism and hegemony. But on the other hand, the attack on Pearl Harbour resulted in a rather diverse security policy, based on multilateralism.

Thanks to the fact that professor Lewis makes us remember our history lessons, we realize that the post 9/11 strategy applied by the Bush Administration has strong roots in the past, beginning in 1814. However, thanks to "Surprise, security and the American Experience", we notice that American leaders also have other options, for example an strategy that gives its due importance to multilateralism, like the one Roosevelt employed after Pearl Harbour.

The author tries to reflect on the September 11 events, and what they meant for America. He shows those events as another instance in which USA's security was shattered, and that motivated a reaction that had noteworthy effects on America's "grand strategy". Lewis wants to understand the implications of what happened, because even though it is remarkably more difficult to be accurate when studying recent events, it is important to do so if those events are essential turning points in history. He says that "We act in the present with a view to shaping the future only on the basis of what we know from the past. So we might as well try to know our recent history as best we can, however imperfect the exercise may be".

On the whole, I think that this is a book that won't make you lose your time. Even though it has only 116 pages and it is quite easy to read, it has a lot of useful information regarding USA's past and present. In my opinion this is almost "obligatory reading material" for those who want to form an opinion regarding USA's current "grand strategy", and to know more about its security policy. After all, is there a better way of grasping the implications of what is happening in the present than studying the past?.

Belen Alcat